Day 1 — Wed, July 1
Day 2 — Thu, July 2
Day 3 — Fri, July 3
8:00
Breakfast
8:45
8:45–9:00
Welcome Address
Welcome Address
9:00
Keynote
Alfred Galichon
NYU Paris
Alfred Galichon
NYU Paris
Keynote
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
University of Amsterdam
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
University of Amsterdam
Keynote
Irene Lo
Stanford University
Irene Lo
Stanford University
10:00
Andrew Tai & Will Sandholtz
Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences
Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences
Omar Besbes, Yash Kanoria & Akshit Kumar
Impact of Rankings and Personalized Recommendations in Marketplaces
Impact of Rankings and Personalized Recommendations in Marketplaces
Vincent Meisner, Müge Süer, Michel Tolksdorf & Sokol Tominaj
Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice
Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice
10:30
Coffee break
11:00
Ignacio Rios & Rahul Sharma
Admission Policies with Exam Retakes: Efficiency–Equity Trade-offs in Multidimensional Scoring
Admission Policies with Exam Retakes: Efficiency–Equity Trade-offs in Multidimensional Scoring
Alice Mazzacurati & Cyril Rouault
Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
Christine Cheng & Will Rosenbaum
Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates
Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates
11:30
Aytek Erdil & Battal Dogan
Matching with Attributes
Matching with Attributes
Aris Filos-Ratsikas & Georgios Kalantzis
The Distortion of Stable Matching
The Distortion of Stable Matching
Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym & Akihisa Tamura
Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts
Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts
12:00
Moshe Babaioff, Rotem Gil & Assaf Romm
Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
Thanh Nguyen & Gergely Csáji
Core Stable Kidney Exchange via Altruistic Donors
Core Stable Kidney Exchange via Altruistic Donors
Christopher En & Yuri Faenza
All Finite Lattices Are Stable Matching Lattices
All Finite Lattices Are Stable Matching Lattices
12:30
Lunch
13:30
Gergely Csáji, Alexander Gundert, Jörg Rothe & Ildikó Schlotter
Clustering via Hedonic Games: New Concepts and Algorithms
Clustering via Hedonic Games: New Concepts and Algorithms
Course · 13:30–14:30
Random Graphs
Laurent Ménard
Random Graphs
Laurent Ménard
Justin Hadad, Irene Lo & Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov
Balancing Welfare and Distributional Goals in School Choice
Balancing Welfare and Distributional Goals in School Choice
14:00
Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando & Toshiyuki Hirai
Stable Matching under Inconsistent Choice Functions
Stable Matching under Inconsistent Choice Functions
Felipe Simon & Nick Arnosti
Greedy Policies for Stationary Dynamic Matching
Greedy Policies for Stationary Dynamic Matching
14:30
Frederik Glitzner & David Manlove
A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
Break (15 min)
Yosuke Yasuda & Yuichiro Kamada
Robust Exchange
Robust Exchange
14:45
Course · 14:45–15:45
Random Graphs (continued)
Laurent Ménard
Random Graphs (continued)
Laurent Ménard
15:00
Coffee break
Coffee break
15:30
Antonio Nicolò, Pietro Salmaso & Riccardo Saulle
Rationalizable Behavior in Matching with Externalities
Rationalizable Behavior in Matching with Externalities
Coffee break (30 min)
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez & Paola Manasero
Lattice Operations for the Stable Set in Many-to-Many Markets via Re-equilibration Dynamics
Lattice Operations for the Stable Set in Many-to-Many Markets via Re-equilibration Dynamics
16:00
Maria Cherifa, Vianney Perchet & Clément Calauzènes
Online Matching on Stochastic Block Model
Online Matching on Stochastic Block Model
Yang Chen, Bettina Klaus & Anh Triêu
Serial Top Trading Cycles Allocations and the Exclusion Core in Mixed-Ownership Object Allocation Problems
Serial Top Trading Cycles Allocations and the Exclusion Core in Mixed-Ownership Object Allocation Problems
16:15
Roundtable · 16:15–17:15
Policies for Kidney Allocation
Policies for Kidney Allocation
16:30
Kei Ikegami, Atsushi Iwasaki, Akira Matsushita & Kyohei Okumura
Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
TBA
How to Secure General Acceptance for a Matching? — Inverse Popular Matchings
How to Secure General Acceptance for a Matching? — Inverse Popular Matchings
17:00
19:00