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Best paper award
- Christine Cheng and Will Rosenbaum: Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: Parametrized Algorithms for Optimal Stable Matchings
Best junior paper award
- Alice Mazzacurati and Cyril Rouault: Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
Accepted Papers
- Ignacio Rios and Rahul Sharma: Admission Policies with Exam Retakes: Efficiency–Equity Trade-offs in Multidimensional Scoring
- Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez and Paola Manasero: Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
- Vincent Meisner, Müge Süer, Michel Tolksdorf and Sokol Tominaj: Confidence and Information in Strategy-Proof School Choice
- Christopher En and Yuri Faenza: All finite lattices are stable matching lattices
- Moshe Babaioff, Rotem Gil and Assaf Romm: Efficient Interview Scheduling for Stable Matching
- Yang Chen, Bettina Klaus and Anh Triêu: Serial Top Trading Cycles Allocations and the Exclusion Core in Mixed-Ownership Object Allocation Problems
- Gergely Csáji, Alexander Gundert, Jörg Rothe and Ildikó Schlotter: Clustering via Hedonic Games: New Concepts and Algorithms
- Aytek Erdil and Battal Dogan: Matching with Attributes
- Christine Cheng and Will Rosenbaum: Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: A Parameterized Algorithm for Optimal Stable Matchings
- Frederik Glitzner and David Manlove: A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
- Thanh Nguyen and Gergely Csáji: Core Stable Kidney Exchange via Altruistic Donors
- Omar Besbes, Yash Kanoria and Akshit Kumar: Impact of Rankings and Personalized Recommendations in Marketplaces
- Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym and Akihisa Tamura: Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts
- Yosuke Yasuda and Yuichiro Kamada: Robust Exchange
- Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai: Stable Matching under Inconsistent Choice Functions
- Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Georgios Kalantzis: The Distortion of Stable Matching
- Kei Ikegami, Atsushi Iwasaki, Akira Matsushita and Kyohei Okumura: Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
- Alice Mazzacurati and Cyril Rouault: Job Matching with Unemployment Benefits
- Erika Bérczi-Kovács and Eszter Szabó: How to secure general acceptance for a matching? – Inverse Popular Matchings
- Antonio Nicolo, Pietro Salmaso and Riccardo Saulle: Rationalizable Behavior in Matching with Externalities
- Justin Hadad, Irene Lo and Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov: Balancing welfare and distributional goals in school choice
- Maria Cherifa, Vianney Perchet and Clément Calauzènes: Online matching on stochastic block model
- Andrew Tai and Will Sandholtz: Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences
- Felipe Simon and Nick Arnosti: Greedy Policies for Stationary Dynamic Matching
Accepted Posters
- Michele Fabi, Viraj Nadkarni, Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Leonardo Leone: Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
- Josue Ortega, Thilo Klein and Mikhail Freer: Experimental School Choice with Parents
- Furkan Dogan, Özgür Yılmaz and Ömer Faruk Şahin: Many-to-many Matching under Spatial Distribution Constraints
- Umutcan Salman: The Revealed Preference Theory of Aggregate Object Allocations
- Jiehua Chen and Ildikó Schlotter: Control in Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: Complexity and Algorithms
- Nguyen Kim Thang: Primal-Dual Algorithms with Predictions for Online Bounded Allocation and Ad-Auctions Problems
- Emile Martinez, Felipe Garrido-Lucero and Umberto Grandi: Stability in Online Assignment Games
- Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Gergely Csáji and Tom Demeulemeester: Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability
- Frederik Glitzner: Designing Pairwise-Stable Agent Seating Arrangements
- Ran Shorrer, Assaf Romm and Avinatan Hassidim: Explaining the Too-Good-To-Be-True Puzzle in Two-Sided Matching
- Pauline Corblet and Alejandro Robinson-Cortés: Multi-sided Matching with Transfers: The Economics of Labor and Love
- Gergely Csáji and Kitti Varga: Modifying Preferences and Capacities for Stability in Flow Networks: Algorithms and Complexity
- Josue Ortega and R. Pablo Arribillaga: A Theory of Justifiable Priority Violations
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